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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK D. COOPER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 20703 
vs. ) 
) 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS ) 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ) 
) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DESERET FFDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, Defendant/Appellant Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association (hereinafter "Deseret Federal") presents the 
following Peply Frief in order to respond to two items 
raised in the Frief of Flaintiff/Respondent Jack S. Cooper 
(hereinafter "Ccoper"). 
POINT I: WHEN DID DESFRET FEDERAL FIRST LEABN OF 
COOPERfS PREACH OF THE "DUE-ON-SALE" CLAUSE? 
At the trial in this matter, a contested issue of fact 
was at what time did Deseret Federal first learn of Cooper!s 
breach of the subject "due-on-salef! clause. There was no 
dispute between the parties that Ccoper sold the subject 
real property to a Gary Ford in May, 1978. After hearing 
the evidence, the Ccurt found that Deseret Federal learned 
of this breach of the non-assumption clause in April, 1979. 
(R. 154.) However, m the Brief of Respondent filed by 
Cooper, there are several challenges to this Court finding. 
For purposes of this appeal, Deseret Federal does not 
challenge the Trial Court's finding that Deseret Federal 
learned of Cooper's breach in April, 1979. 
It is difficult to determine the basis of Mr. Cooper's 
challenge to the Court's finding since Cooper's Brief is 
completely devoid of any reference to the trial transcript. 
For example, Cooper states, "inasmuch as the fact situation 
shows that such Notice of Default was not commenced for a 
period in excess of six years after notification of sale". 
(Frief of Respondent, pp. 3-4.) Such a statement is com-
pletely unsupported by the record. Deseret Federal recorded 
its Notice of Default on June 5, 1984, a little more than 
five years after first learning of Cooper's breach in the 
due-on-sale clause. (R. 156.) This five year period 
includes cvex one year that Deseret Federal was prohibited, 
by Mr. Gary Ford's bankruptcy, from taking any action. 
The time period between when Deseret Federal first 
learned of the breach of the due-on-sale clause and when 
Deseret Federal recorded its Notice of Default is important 
because Deseret Federal, both at trial and on appeal, 
maintains that a six-year statute of limitations applies to 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The Record on Appeal, 
which includes a Transcript of the Evidence, clearly 
demonstrates that less than four years of the applicable 
statute had run! Thus, Mr. Cooper's unsupported allegation 
on appeal that more than six years had run is incorrect. 
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POINT II: ANY REFERENCE BY COOPER TO DESERET FEDERAL'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND 
INTEREST IS IMPROPER. 
When the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Court was 
terminated in February of 1984 so that Deseret Federal could 
proceed to foreclose its interest on the subject real 
property, Cooper was delinquent in the monthly payments of 
principal and interest due on the secured loan. On April 
16, 1984, Cooper tendered to Deseret Federal sufficient 
funds to bring those payments current. However, the tender 
was conditioned upon Deseret Federal's waiving the require-
ments contained in the dre-on-sale clause. Thus, Deseret 
Federal refused the tender. (P. 155, 325-332.) Subsequent 
to the conditioned tender, Deseret Federal recorded its 
Notice of Default. The Notice does not refer to any default 
in monthly payments. Instead, the Notice of Default refers 
exclusively to Cooper's breach of the due-on-sale clause. 
(R. 69-70.) 
Mr. Cooper filed his Complaint against Deseret Federal 
on August 29, 1984. (R. 1-6.) Counsel was shortly there-
after hired by Deseret Federal to defend it in this matter. 
Upon being retained, counsel sent to Cooper's attorney the 
letter that is attached hereto as Appendix "Aft. This letter 
was presented to the Court during oral arguments at the 
close of evidence. (Tr. 197-200.) Mr. Cooper did not 
immediately accept the proposals, as outlined in counsel's 
letter. However, after discussions between counsel, on 
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December 27, 1984, Cooper did bring his monthly payments of 
principal and interest current. (R. 156.) 
Shortly after the above-described payment was made, the 
parties conducted depositions. During the deposition of an 
employee of Deseret Federal, Wayne Mack, Cooper's counsel 
asked the following: 
0 Now, you have accepted $100,000 
from Mr. Cooper. 
A That's right. 
0 Can you tell me why ycu have 
accepted that now and you wouldn't have in 
the past? 
MR. HATCH I know we have agreed 
to hold all objections, but I think ycu are 
being a little unfair, here, Grant. There 
is a large part that acceptance was based 
upon communication between you and I. And 
a large part, if not settlement, but it was 
agreed that would have no impact upon 
whether or not ycur case is proper or our 
defense is proper. 
THE WITNESS My understanding from 
taking the money was that the delinquency 
aspect of the loan should be cleared up and 
the due-on-sale matter should be handled as 
a separate item. 
Q (Ey Mr. Ivins) That was my 
understanding. Well, I apologize if I am 
making that rough on you. 
A No, not at all. 
Q That was our understanding, but 
it has been accepted at this time? 
A Sure has. 
(Deposition of Wayne Mack, pp. 23-24.) 
Thus, the payment of this delinquent principal and interest 
was not an issue at the time of trial. Further, it was not 
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identified as an issue of fact or law in the Court's Pretrial 
Order. It is therefore surprising that Cooper is attempting 
to raise the issue of payment on appeal. 
Cooper states in his Erief, "Another disturbing fact 
involved in this case is that defendant, Deseret Federal, 
has accepted sufficient payments from the plaintiff to put 
the loan in a current status at the present time.11 (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 8.) Obviously, this is not a disturbing 
fact. It was the result of negotiations between the parties' 
course!. It benefits both parties. Deseret Federal would 
not have to report the Cooper loan as delinquent. Cooper 
can take the tax benefits of the interest payments in 
current years. And, should this Court reverse the lower 
Court's Judgment, Cooper would be required to pay off or 
find alternative financing on a much smaller amount. It is 
improper of Cooper to raise the spurious issue of "payment" 
of interest and principal on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there was no proper legal or factual basis for 
the District Court to permanently enjoin Deseret Federal 
from accelerating its loan by reason of Cooper's violation 
of the "due-on-sale" clause, and since there was no legal 
basis for the District Court's award of attorney's fees, the 
District Court's Judgment should be reversed. 
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DATED this day of May, 1986. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
By 
Joseph E. Hatch 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1986, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Peply Frief of 
Appellant were Trailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mr. Heber Grant Ivins 
Attorney at Law 
75 North Center Street 
American Fork, Utah C4003 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
311 SOUTH STATE SUITE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 801-532-2707 
October 9, 1984 
Mr. Reber Grant Ivins 
Attorney at Law 
75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Re: Jack S. Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association; Our File No. 5188 
Dear Mr. Ivins: 
My firm has been hired to represent Deseret Federal in 
the above action in a co-counsel capacity with Gary Weight. 
Wayne Mack of Deseret Federal has informed me that he has 
been discussing an interim settlement with Mr. Cooper. Mr. 
Cooper apparently responded favorably to this proposal. 
Thus, I felt I should put the prcposal in writing for your 
review. 
1. Until the above litigation is resolved, Deseret 
Federal will agree to not schedule a trustee's sale on the 
apartment complex. 
2. Mr. Cooper will not be required to post a bond to 
stop said sale. 
3. Mr. Cooper will bring the loan on the apartment 
complex current. The bring-current amount will include all 
monthly interest, principal and escrow amounts, late charges 
due until March 15, 1984, and attorney's fees and costs due 
by reason of Gary Ford's bankruptcy and default in payments. 
4. Mr. Cooper will continue to make the regular 
monthly payments during the course of litigation. 
5. By accepting payments, Deseret Federal waives none 
of its rights under the "due-on-sale" clause. By making 
payments, Mr. Cooper waives none of his rights as stated in 
his Complaint. 
Please let me know if this interim proposal is 
satisfactory. I believe that it will have several benefits. 
First, Deseret Federal will have a great deal more leeway 
EOWARO M GARRETT 
THOMAS C STURDY 
JOSEPH E HATCH 
MICHAEL A KATZ 
APPENDIX "A" 
Heber Grant Ivins, Esq* 
October 9, 1984 
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under Federal regulations to settle this matter if the loan 
is brought current. Secondly, should Deseret Federal 
prevail in the litigation, your client would have paid down 
the loan substantially at a lower interest rate. 
Very truly yours, 
GARRETT AND STURDY/ 
^pu^vsj^fcr 
Joseph E. Hatch 
JEH/lam 
cc: Gary Weight 
Wayne Mack 
